

Pacific Theater and Principles of War

- Economy of Force
 - Germany First strategy made Pacific a secondary theater
- Unity of Command
 - Interservice rivalry leads to twin drives, one from the south Pacific and one across the central Pacific
- Island hopping
 - Japanese control so many Pacific Islands, Allied forces must choose strategically


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- Maneuver
 - Sea power gave the US the ability to go where it wanted
- Security
 - intelligence intercepts gave the US an advantage
[Navajo code-breakers]
- Objective
 - MacArthur strongly influenced by desire to return to the Philippines

Compromise

- King's drive would move first against the Gilbert Islands and then toward the Philippines
- MacArthur would likewise advance toward the Philippines
 - Joint Chiefs gave no clear priority to either drive
 - “Mutual supporting” or “mutually competing?”

Twin Drives





Hiroshima and Nagasaki

- US planned to invade Japan with eleven Army and Marine divisions (650,000 troops)
- Casualty estimates for the operation were as high as 1,400,000
- Truman decided to use the atomic bomb to avoid such losses
- Hiroshima 6 Aug 1945
- Nagasaki 9 Aug 1945
- Surrender 2 Sept 1945

Post-war Impact of Atomic Bomb

- Changed the very nature of war
 - Presented the possibility of annihilation of humankind
- US comes to place great strategic reliance on atomic bomb
 - War plans emphasize sudden atomic attack against USSR to allow time for conventional mobilization
- US holds atomic monopoly until 1949
 - Huge US-USSR arms race follows
 - Eventually leads to Mutually Assured Destruction (1967)
- Massive retaliation strategy (1954) meant US was prepared to respond to Soviet aggression with a massive nuclear strike
- Nuclear weapons prove to not be a reasonable option in limited wars